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Abstract
Using the Generalised Lotka Volterra (GLV) model adapted to deal with muti
agent systems we can investigate economic systems from a general viewpoint and
obtain generic features common to most economies. Assuming only weak generic
assumptions on capital dynamics, we are able to obtain very specific predictions for
the distribution of social wealth. First, we show that in a ’fair’ market, the wealth
distribution among individual investors fulfills a power law. We then argue that ’fair
play’ for capital and minimal socio-biological needs of the humans traps the economy
within a power law wealth distribution with a particular Pareto exponent α ∼ 3/2.
In particular we relate it to the average number of individuals L depending on the
average wealth: α ∼ L/(L − 1). Then we connect it to certain power exponents
characterising the stock markets. We obtain that the distribution of volumes of
the individual (buy and sell) orders follows a power law with similar exponent
β ∼ α ∼ 3/2. Consequently, in a market where trades take place by matching pairs
of such sell and buy orders, the corresponding exponent for the market returns
is expected to be of order γ ∼ 2α ∼ 3. These results are consistent with recent
experimental measurements of these power law exponents ([Maslov 2001] for β and
[Gopikrishnan et al. 1999] for γ).
Keywords: Pareto-Zipf, Lotka-Volterra, power law; random multiplicative pro-
cess; wealth distribution; market returns.
1 Power Laws and Logistic Equations
It was first observed by Pareto [1897 sic!] that in an economy, the fraction P (w) of
people owning a wealth w is proportional to a power of w:
P (w) ∼ w−1−α (1)
For the last hundred years the value of α ∼ 3/2 changed little in time and across the
various capitalist economies.
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Aoki and Yoshikawa [1999] quote Montroll [1978] to the effect that ”almost all the
social phenomena, except in their relatively brief abnormal times obey the logistic growth”
[Lotka 1925, Volterra 1926]:
dw/dt = Aw − Bw2 (2)
It was shown [Solomon and Levy 1996, Levy and Solomon 1996, Biham et. al 1998] that
Generalized Lotka Volterra (GLV) systems explicitating the aggregated logistic equation
(2) at the microscopic agents level lead to power law distributions of the form (1). One
can therefore say that the careful reconsideration of the system (2), led to the solution of
a 100 year old puzzle by a 75 year old equation.
In the next sections we
- introduce the GLV model,
- show that it reduces to a set of decoupled stationary linear stochastic equations.
- derive analytically the Pareto law for the relative wealth distribution in the GLV
model.
- explain the Pareto exponent α ∼ 3/2 based on intrinsic biological and social con-
straints
- relate via the GLV dynamics the Pareto exponent α ∼ 3/2 to the exponents of
various stock market distributions. In particular GLV suggests that distribution of the
volumes of the individual buy/sell orders is a power law with an exponent β ∼ 3/2. For
the distribution of the trade-by-trade returns the predicted exponent is γ ∼ 3.
2 The Generalized Lotka -Volterra Model
Let us consider the dynamical system:
dwi(t) = wi(t+ τ )− wi(t) = [εi(t)σi + ci(w1, w2, ..., wN , t)]wi(t) + aiΣjbjwj(t) (3)
with i, j = 1, 2, ..., N .
The interpretation of the various terms is as follows:
• dwi(t) = wi(t + τ ) − wi(t) is the time evolution of the wealth of the individual i
during the time interval τ .
• The random variables εi(t) represent the purely stochastic fluctuations in the re-
turns of the various investors and since we express the square standard deviations by the
variables σ2i one can assume without loss in generality that
< εi(t)
2 >= 1 (4)
• The systematic endogenous and exogenous trends in the returns are expressed by
the arbitrary functions ci(w1, w2, ..., wN , t).
• Since the average value, mi(t) =< εi(t) > can be absorbed in ci, we may assume
without loss in generality that:
mi(t) =< εi(t) >= 0 (5)
• the terms aiΣjbjwj(t) represent the wealth redistribution by taxes, salaries, subsidies,
etc. More precisely bjrepresents how much of the wealth of the individual j contributes
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to the total wealth to be redistributed while the coefficients ai > 0 represent the amount
of wealth redistributed to the individual i.
Since an overall factor in the bj ’s can be absorbed in an overall factor in the ai’s, one
can assume without loss in generality that:
Σjbj = 1 (6)
We will also assume here that all σ2i , ci and ai are of order τ and all bj ’s are positive of
order 1/N . Situations in which the coefficients describe certain neighbourhood structures
in the investor’s space have been studied in [Shnerb et. al 2000, 2001].
For arbitrary, unequal ci factors, the dynamics of (3) will lead to systematically increas-
ing inequalities in the relative wealths xi. In particular, individuals i with very negative
ciwill keep loosing wealth. If they do it indefinitely, they will eventually disappear from
the market (see however Levy, Persky and Solomon 1996, Farmer 1999, Solomon and Levy
2000, for other periodic, quasi-periodic and more complex regimes). The disappearence
of the weakest, together with a host of other phenomena (adaptability, exploitation until
exhaustion of systematic gain opportunities, adverse market effects: the largest players
bidding against oneselves) leads usually to the ”efficient market” regime. In simple
words, ”market efficency” means that the market is more efficient than any one individ-
ual in discovering the ’correct’ prices and eliminating thereby the possibility of systematic
speculative gain. While it is interesting to study the effects of eventual departures from
”market efficiency” and their duration [Farmer 1999, Levy, Perski and Solomon 1996,
Solomon and Levy 2000] it is reasonable to assume that for long time intervals, market
efficiency holds and that except for the purely stochastic factors εi(t) all the individuals
have the same expected relative returns. i.e:
ci(w1, w2, ..., wN , t) = c(w1, w2, ..., wN , t) (7)
Then, in the limit
ai/σ
2
i >> 1/lnN (8)
one can show [Biham et al 1998, Huang and Solomon 2000, 2001, Blank and Solomon
2000] that the global dynamics of the economy can be expressed by taking the sum of the
equations (3) each weighted by bj to obtain:
du(t) = u(t+ τ)− u(t) = c(w1, w2, ..., wN , t)u(t) + au(t) (9)
where
a(t) = Σibiai(t) (10)
u(t) = Σjbjwj(t) (11)
and we have used equation (5) to neglect, in the limit N → ∞, the sum of the random
terms. One can think of the variable u as a weighted average wealth.
Obviously for arbitrary functions c(w1, w2, ..., wN , t), the time evolution of u(t) and
the functions wi(t) can be very eventfull [Levy, Persky and Solomon, 1996, Farmer 1999,
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Levy, Levy and Solomon 2000, Solomon and Levy 2000]. However we show below that
the probability distribution of the relative wealth
xi(t) = wi(t)/u(t) (12)
has sometimes a much simpler behavior. By applying the chain differentiaton rule to (12)
and using both (3) and (7) one gets:
dxi(t) = dwi/u− wi/u
2du (13)
= [εi(t)σi + c]xi(t) + ai − xi(t)[c+ a] (14)
= (εi(t)σi − a)xi(t) + ai (15)
I.e. the system of equations splits into a set of independent, linear, time independent
stochastic equations:
dxi(t) = εiσixi(t)− axi(t) + ai (16)
Note that this holds even if σi, Di and ai are functions of the corresponding xi. In fact one
obtains [Richmond 2000, Richmond and Solomon 2000, Solomon and Richmond 2000]:
P (xi) =
exp{2
∫
[−axi(t) + ai]/[σixi]
2dxi}
[σixi]2
(17)
In the particular case when σi and ai are constant, one obtains:
P (xi) ∼ x
−1−αi
i exp[
−2ai
xiσ2i
] (18)
where
αi = 1 + 2a/σ
2
i (19)
Note that in this approach one can have subpopulations that differ in their regular
additive incomes, ai and/or in their standard deviation for the multiplicative (speculative)
returns,σ2i . In particular if has, for example, a sub-population involved in a NASDAQ
like system with large σ2i this population will possess an αi much smaller than the rest of
the population engaged in classical or ’old economy’ investment behaviour. This in turn
will imply the concentration of wealth in a few ’lucky’ hands as shown in section 4. This
will lead to market fluctuations which are significantly enhanced. This simly reflects the
fact that wealth changes that occur are fractions of wealth of very wealthy individuals.
(Think for example of the change in the market index induced by Bill Gates losing the
current court case.) Obviously, a certain dependence of ai or σ
2
i on xi may modify the
power law exponent when substituted in (17).
In the case where all the coefficients are i-independent, i.e. σ2i = σ
2, ai = a and
bi = 1/N one gets:
P (x) ∼ x−1−αexp[−2a/(σ2x)] (20)
with
α = 1 + 2a/σ2 (21)
[Kesten 1973, Solomon and Levy 1996, Sornette and Cont 1997, Solomon 1998, Marsili,
Maslov and Zhang 1998, Bouchaud and Mezard 2000]. The distribution P (x) has a peak
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at x0 = 1/(1+D/a). Above x0, the relative wealth distribution P (x) behaves like a power
law while below x0, P (x) vanishes very fast.
One can show that for finite N , the main corrections are:
1) a factor which vanishes at x = N . This is consistent with the fact that there cannot
be an agent with wealth wi(t) larger than the total wealth Nw(t):
P (x) = x−1−αexp[−2a/(xD)]exp[−2a/(D(1 − x/N))] (22)
2) a correction to α:
α = 1 + 2[a/D −K]/[1 +K] (23)
where
K = N−2+2/α ∼ N−4a/D/(1+2a/D) (24)
This implies α < 1 if N << exp(D/a) i.e. the wealth gets concentrated in just a few
hands [Malcai, Biham and Solomon 1999, Blank and Solomon 2000, Huang and Solomon
2001].
3 Why has the Pareto exponent been constant for
the last 100 troubled years
Until now, we have explained the survival of the individual wealth power law (18), (20),
(22) in the presence of large time variations in the total wealth. We now relate the con-
stant value of α ∼ 3/2 measured over the last 100 years (and for all the major capitalist
economies) [Pareto 1897, Zipf 1949, Levy and Solomon 1997] to the social and biological
constraints imposed on any society. The main idea is to exploit the particular charac-
teristics of the shape of the wealth distribution curve (20) in order to relate the power
decay of the probability distribution at large wealth to the wealth distribution of the
poorest agents. This is possible since both the exponent α = 1 + 2a/σ2 of the power
law for large wealth and the coefficient 2a/σ2 in the exponential of -1/x that dominates
low wealth behavior, depend on the single parameter a/σ2. Consequently, how poor the
poor are allowed (or can afford) to be, determines the power low distribution of more
wealthy agents via the ratio a/σ2. The crucial expression a/σ2 can be understood as the
ratio between additive regular incomes (salaries, social security, services) and the purely
random multiplicative incomes originating in speculative market activities.
One of the crucial characteristics of the distribution P (x) (20) is the fact that as one
goes to lower and lower x→ 0 values below it maximum x0 ∼ 1/(1+D/a), its decay to 0
is extremely fast. In fact all its derivatives are 0 at x = 0. Given this sharp decay at low
w values, one can assume that effectively, the distribution P (x) vanishes below a certain
minimal relative wealth xm (poverty bound). The value of xm can be estimated roughly
by assuming that there are no individuals below it and that above it, the power law is
fulfilled. Then one gets the relation between α and x m from the identity
< x >=< xi(t) > (25)
=< wi(t)/w(t) >= w/w = 1 (26)
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which implies:
1 = [
∫
xm
x−αdx]/[
∫
xm
x−1−αdx] (27)
= [−1/(1− α)x1−αm ]/[−1/(−α)x
−α
m ] (28)
= xmα/(α− 1) (29)
or:
α = 1/(1− xm) (30)
[Ijiri and Simon 1977, Levy and Solomon 1996, Malcai et al 99, Blank and Solomon 2000].
According (21) this yields:
xm = 1− 1/α = 1/(1 + 1/2 σ
2/a)
Based on (30), (31) one can now give a general scenario of how the internal interests
and constraints within society lead to the actual value of α ∼ 3/2 measured repeatedly
in various economies in the last 100 years. Suppose that in a given economy the wealth
necessary to keep a person alive is K. Certainly, anybody having less than that will have
a very destabilizing effect on the society, so the number of people with wealth less then
K should be negligible if that society is to survive. Let us now suppose that the average
family supported by an average wealth, has in average L members . Clearly they will need
a wealth of order KL, otherwise the wage earners will seek to correct the situation by
strikes, negotiations, elections or revolts. Note that in a sense, the wealth of the average
family is the definition of the minimal amount for supporting L dependents, since the
prices of the prime necessities will always adjust to it (i.e. if the average wealth increases
so will the prices of housing, services, etc.).
In short, while the poorest people (who may not be able to afford a family) will ensure
for their own survival that they do not get less than 1/L of the average, the average
population will almost by definition take care that their income is at least L times the
minimal wealth. In this way they insure the survival of their offspring. All in all, we are
lead to the conclusion that
xm ∼ 1/L
is dictated by the compromise between the survival instincts of the individual and the
reproduction interesses of the species. Using equation (30) one further predicts:
α = 1/(1− xm) ∼ L/(L− 1). (31)
These relations fit well the known numbers for typical capitalist economies in the last
century: family size L ∼ 3− 4, poverty line (below which people get subsidized)
xm ∼ 1/4− 1/3
and α ∼ 1.33− 1.5.
Our other key conclusion is, therefore, that the lower bound on the relative poverty
governs totally the overall relative wealth distribution. The details of the dynamics by
which this distribution arises are of course complex and depend on the interactions in the
system.
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Most likely, during periods of large speculative fluctuations σ2 which can give rise
to significant numbers of ”nouveau riches” , regular wage earners will demand that the
salaries, pensions and social security (all contributing to a in) will increase in such a
manner that the ratio a/σ2 returns to the value 1/6 - 1/4 consistent with xm = 1/(1 +
1/2σ2/a) = 1/L with L ∼ 3− 4. During ’bearish’ periods (small σ2) salaries a will erode
leading again to a ratio a/σ2 that is fixed around:
a/σ2 ∼ 1/[2(L− 1)] ∼ 1/4− 1/6
. Consequently, the value of α ∼ L/(L− 1) is kept fixed too around α ∼ 3/2− 4/3. The
Pareto experimental result α ∼ 1.4 falls well inside this range.
One may object that at the begining of the century the number of children per couple
was larger. However, one should keep in mind that at that time children started to earn
their living at an early age, so the number of dependent children per wage earner was not
far from 3-4. Moreover a slow shift towards larger values of α (1.5-1.7) (corresponding
to lower L values) seems to take place in modern economies with strong social security
policies.
4 Heavy Tails of Buy/ Sell Order Volumes and Mar-
ket Returns Distributions in GLV
We discuss here some practical implications for the finacial markets of the formal results
obtained in the previous sections.
In particular we derive the values that GLV suggests for the exponents of the proba-
bility distributions of
• volumes of sell/buy orders = the amounts that the traders request to buy or sell.
GLV suggests an exponent of the order α ∼ 3/2.
• trade-by-trade returns = the stock price variations from one trade to the next. GLV
suggests and exponent γ ∼ 2α ∼ 3.
According to Eq. (3), the variation of an individual investment is to lowest order in τ
the term proportional to σi ∼ τ
1/2:
dwi(t) = wi(t+ τ )− wi(t) = εi(t)σiwi(t) (32)
That is, according the GLV model, the variations in the invested capital are proportional
to the capital itself. The proportionality of individual investments and returns to the
individual wealth is a crucial property of the capital and a crucial ingredient of the GLV
(and LLS) model. It is consistent [Levy and Solomon 97] with the experimental fact that
the distribution of annual individual returns fulfills a power law with an exponent α equal
to the one of the wealth distribution (3/2).
In fact, if one uses the experimental fact that the investors have constant relative
risk aversion then, one can prove [Levy, Levy Solomon 2000] that their utility functions
are powers of their wealth. This in turn implies that the fraction of wealth that such an
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investor considers as optimal to invest is a fraction (that depends on the investor’s current
expectations) of his personal wealth. This is to be contrasted with the implications of the
non-realistic (experimentally rejected but often used for analytical expediency) constant
absolute risk aversion assumption. This would lead to an exponential utility function
which predicts personal investments which are independent on the investor’s wealth.
It is therefore very reasonable to assume that each buy/ sell order volume is stochas-
tically proportional to the wealth of the trader that emits it.
Therefore, a natural implication of the GLV model [Levy and Solomon 97, Solomon
2000] is that the volumes of the individual sell/buy orders are distributed too by a power
law with an exponent β ∼ α ∼ 3/2 equal to the exponent of the Pareto individual
wealth distribution. This is confirmed by measurements reported by [Maslov 2001] and
[Gopikrishnan et al. 2000] where the order volumes are distributed by a power law with
exponent α < 2.
Let us now estimate the exponent of the distribution of market price variations from
one trade to another (trade-by-trade returns). Since the value of a stock is proportional
to the sum of the individual investments in that stock, the trade-by-trade returns are
stochastically proportional to the volumes traded in the individual trades. In fact the
stochastic correlations between trade volumes and absolute value of the returns are well
documented in the literature. In an ideal market where trading and price fixing take
place in a centralized way [LLS, Biham et al] via a market maker who matches globally
all individual demands / ofers such as to saturate the overall market demand/ ofer, it
follows that trade volumes (and trade-by-trade returns) obey power laws with the same
exponents as the buy/ sell order volumes γ ∼ β ∼ α ∼ 3/2.
However, in most real markets, the trades take place by the matching of pairs of buy
and sell orders with compatible prices. In such a case the volume of each trade is equal
to the smallest among the volumes of the matched pair. The prediction for distribution
of trade volumes is now very different: Since the probability for each of 2 matched orders
to exceed (or equal) a certain volume v is
P (> v) ∼ v−α (33)
the probability that both have a volume (equal or) larger than v is the product:
P (> v,> v) ∼ P (> v)P (> v) ∼ v−αv−α ∼ v−2α (34)
So the prediction of GLV for such a market measurement is that the trades volumes and
the trade-by-trade returns will fulfill a power law with an exponent
γ ∼ 2α ∼ 3 (35)
While for very short times, and small returns the exponent γ ∼ 3 in the returns power
distribution is masked by various other effects (e.g. subtelties related to the differentiation
between market orders and limit orders and the way one accounts for a large order that is
saturated by the sequential matching with a series of smaller orders; this accounts also for
some apparent discrepancies between [Maslov 2001] and [Gopikrishnan et. al 2000]), for
a wide range of parameters, the empirical data confirm an exponent γ ∼ 3 in the power
tails of the market returns distributions [Gopikrishnan et al 1999].
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5 Conclusions
By analyzing economic dynamics from a general viewpoint we have demonstrated fea-
tures that are common to most economies. Assuming only weak generic assumptions on
capital dynamics, we are able to obtain very specific predictions for the distribution of
social wealth. A crucial assumption is that the capital market is fair, i.e. equal capi-
tals have equal opportunities. Mathematically, this is expressed via the assumption that
expectations for returns are independent of i . We show that in such a market, the
wealth distribution among individual investors fulfills a power law.The balance between
”fair play” for the capital and minimal socio-biological needs of the humans seems to
trap the world economy into a power law wealth distribution which determines much of
its dynamical and equilibrium properties and in particular the Pareto exponent α ∼ 3/2.
Moreover, the model is consistent with the recent measurments of the power law exponents
of the distributions of order volumes and market returns [Maslov 2001, Gopikrishnan et
al. 1999].
This paper is dedicated respectfully to the memory of Herbert Simon.
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